The memory illusion we explore in this pa-milestone of cognitive development, we suggest that the use of subjective experience in per results from the misinterpretation of what is actually an effect of the past in ways that social prediction is a pervasive form of judgment even in adults. However, subjective exalters one's subjective experience of a current situation. Such misinterpretations or misattri-perience can be spoiled as a basis for judgment for others because of the effects of specific butions of effects of the past are consequential because we often predict for others based on past experiences on one's performance. People display a form of adult egocentrism when our own experience. For example, people attempt to predict whether readers understand they fail to realize that their subjective experience of the difficulty of a problem, the comthe ideas in a manuscript, whether students will be able to solve problems on an exam, or prehensibility of a text, or the ease of learning a task may not generalize to other people's whether consumers will buy a new version of experience. a soft drink. Whereas Piaget argued that the In contrast to judgments based on subjecability to take another's perspective was a tive experience are judgments based on a theory, or more minimally, a collection of rules. This research was supported by a grant to Larry Jacoby Judgments that derive from the application of from the National Science and Engineering Research a theory afford more conscious control over Council of Canada. Thanks to Ann Hollingshead for test-the factors that enter into the judgment. In ing the participants and for her help on the analyses. particular, use of a theory should allow people
The major purpose of this paper is to investi-of communication effectiveness by having participants play a game of ''Password.'' On gate the phenomenon of how past experience can invalidate subjective experience as a basis each trial a participant generated three clue words that would allow the audience to generfor judgment and what people do when they attempt to escape those effects. A second pur-ate a target word, and then estimated the percentage of the audience that would correctly pose is to explore the power and general applicability of the distinction between theory-based guess the word. Participants overestimated their percentage of successful communication and subjective experience-based judgments. We will illustrate the distinction between theory and by 20%. Similar overestimation occurred in a study where university instructors attempted subjective experience as bases for judgment with a set of experiments on how people judge to fill out a quiz ''as an average student in your class will perform.'' Nickerson, Baddethe difficulty of anagrams. These experiments set up diagnostic tools for revealing different ley, and Freeman (1987) found that people gave higher estimates for the percentage of bases for judgments.
people who would know the answer to specific SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE AS A general knowledge questions when they knew BASIS FOR JUDGMENT the answer themselves relative to when they did not know the answers. Our interpretation Extending one's own subjective experience to predictions for others should be a useful is that participants in these experiments made their estimations based on their own knowlheuristic, with accuracy dependent upon the extent to which people's experience is similar. edge and feelings of familiarity. For example, because people have essentially THE ANALYTIC ALTERNATIVE equivalent sensory and perceptual systems they can accurately judge how others will exWhereas subjective experience is nonanalytic and global, a well-specified theory properience sensory stimuli along dimensions such as loudness or brightness. The consensus vides an analytic basis for judgments (Jacoby & Brooks, 1984) . When one uses a theregarding such judgments masks the fact that people are making an inductive leap from their ory to make judgments, particular factors can be given more or less weight or can be considown experience to predict the experience of others. The judgments may be experienced as ered irrelevant and ignored entirely. Such analytic judgments give people control over the objective judgments of the stimulus, rather than an extension of ''how it appears to me.'' information that will enter into their decisions.
The ability to control irrelevant factors and Only when people try to predict for people who are significantly different from them in consistently apply rules to escape the vagaries of attention can lead to the superiority of actusome way does it (sometimes) become apparent that they are using their own experience arial over intuitive or nonanalytic judgments (Dawes, Faust, & Meehl, 1989) . as a basis for judgment, as when older people insist that it is too dim in a room to read and An analytic alternative to teachers' use of their own understanding as a basis for prethus believe that their children should turn on more lights before they ''ruin their eyes.'' dicting for students would be a theory that specifies the difficulty of constructs. For exCognitive experiences have an immediacy and compelling quality that make them appear ample, a formal model of text comprehension (van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983) could be an objecas objective as basic perceptual experiences such as loudness or brightness. For example, tive basis for judging comprehensibility. Such a theory would allow teachers to avoid the people treat their own understanding as an objective indicator of the comprehensibility of problem of overestimating their student's knowledge. Unfortunately, such models do a message and so overestimate how well an audience will understand their message. Gor-not exist in many domains, and those that do exist are laborious to apply. A collection of anson (1985) demonstrated the overestimation rules such as ''the concept of a sampling dis-familiar than false statements. Similarly, sentences against a softer background noise are tribution of means is always hard'' and diagnostic cues such as questions and glazed eyes easier to understand and words presented for a longer duration are easier to see, so ease of could also enter into a more analytic prediction of student understanding. However, to de-perception is a generally valid cue for loudness and duration. However, because ease of velop and use a good theory, people must know the relation between diagnostic cues and processing plays such a critical role in both the subjective experience of remembering and the criterion variable, and be able to recognize those diagnostic cues. An excellent theory also in the subjective experience of structural aspects of stimuli, people are open to misattribuneeds to properly weight and combine relevant factors.
tions. Misattributions produce illusions of memory when ease of processing is subtly ma-FLUENCY AS A CONSTITUENT OF nipulated by changing structural characteris-SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE tics of the situation (Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989; Whittlesea et al., 1990 ; Whittlesea, To understand the role of subjective experience in judgment, we need to understand the 1993). Conversely, past experiences can alter the subjective experience of the present (Withcomponent processes that give rise to particular experiences. One important constituent of erspoon & Allan, 1985; Begg et al., 1992; Jacoby et al. 1988 ; Bornstein & D'Agostino, subjective experience is the ease or speed with which people accomplish a task. The avail-1994; Kelley & Lindsay, 1993; Whittlesea, 1993) For example, if one judges the quality ability heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973 ) is a prominent example: people judge the fre-of a paper in terms of how easily one is able to follow it, the quality of the writing often quency of events based on the ease with which they can think of instances of the event. How-seems to improve with each rereading. Arguments that were originally difficult to follow ever, ease or fluency of processing is a component in a variety of experiences. Fluency of now seem easy to grasp and sentences that were awkward to parse now seem smooth. perceptual and conceptual processing influences the subjective experiences of duration After the first reading, comprehension has been pervasively altered, and attempts to ig- (Witherspoon & Allan, 1985) , truth (Begg, Anas, & Farinacci, 1992) , loudness (Jacoby, nore the previous reading of the paper will not enable one to recapture the experience of a Allan, Collins, & Larwill, 1988) , pleasantness (Bornstein & D'Agostino, 1994; Whittlesea, naive reader. What strategies are available when subjec-1993), confidence in answers to questions (Kelley & Lindsay, 1993) , the feeling of tive experience as a basis for judgment has been spoiled by past experience? When people knowing (Koriat, 1993) , and even remembering (Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989 ; Whittlesea, recognize that their experience has been altered by past experiences not shared by the Jacoby, & Girard, 1990; Whittlesea, 1993) .
The use of ease of processing as a basis for audience for whom they are predicting, they may attempt to compensate or correct for the experiences cited above may be a generally valid cue. One major effect of past experi-those effects. In the example of judging whether a paper is well-written, one might ence is to make later processing faster, so fluent perception might be a quite good cue that subtract a constant value from the rating for each time a paper has been read. However, one is remembering rather than encountering someone or something for the first time (Ja-that sort of correction may be relatively crude-it is unlikely that changes in comprecoby, Kelley, & Dywan, 1989 ). People's use of fluent processing as a basis for truth could hension due to prior reading of a paper operates in an additive fashion. Instead, the effect be learned from repeated experience with fluency as a valid cue, given that true statements of prior experience on later comprehensibility is probably more complicated and interactive, should be more often repeated and hence more such that it contributes more to the compre-ence. To do this, the theory would have to specify the factors influencing the difficulty hensibility of some sections of a paper than to others. of anagrams and would also have to specify how those factors interact.
SEPARATION OF SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE
We arranged a third condition to investigate FROM ANALYSIS possible effects of prior experience on subjective experience of anagram difficulty. In that One purpose of our experiments was to document that subjective experience and theory condition, the solution words appeared in an earlier phase of the experiment. In the earlier serve as qualitatively different bases for predicting the performance for others. The para-phase, participants simply read a list of words, half of which appeared later in the experiment digm we used is best illustrated with an example. How difficult would it be for people to as anagrams to be solved. We predicted that prior reading of the solution words would lead solve the anagram fscar? Most of our participants answered that question by first solving to faster solution times for the anagrams (Dominowski & Ekstrand, 1967) . However, the anagram and then answering on the basis of whether they found it easy or difficult to would participants be aware of that influence on their performance and so discount their solve. Consider what would happen if we asked people to judge the difficulty of an ana-subjective experience when judging for others? If so, they might shift to theory-based gram with the answer present, for example, scarf fscar. The solution word blocks one predictions and produce a pattern of results similar to the Anagrams with Solution condifrom directly experiencing how difficult it is to come up with the solution to the anagram tion. However, participants could be unconsciously influenced by prior experience, either because the solution is already in mind. Presenting the solution deprives one from using because they failed to remember having read a solution word or failed to understand its insubjective experience as a basis for predicting the performance of others. We suggest that fluence on their later solving of an anagram (cf. Bowers, 1984) . If participants in the Old with the solution present, one is forced to judge the difficulty of the anagram on the basis Anagrams Alone condition were influenced unconsciously by the prior presentation, they of some theory about anagrams, or rules such as ''low frequency words would be harder to would rely on their subjective experience and produce a pattern of judgments similar to that generate. '' We predicted that judgments based on sub-of participants in the anagram-alone condition. jective experience would be made more rapidly than would those based on a theory. We also predicted that using the subjective experi-EXPERIMENT ONE ence of difficulty (New Anagram Alone items) Method would lead to a different pattern of judgments for others than would theory-based judgments Participants. The participants were 72 volunteers from an introductory psychology (Anagram with Solution items). If subjective experience is a different basis for judging dif-course at McMaster University who served in the experiment for course credit. Participants ficulty than is a theory, then particular anagrams should yield different judgments under were randomly assigned to one of three between-subject experiment conditions: Old the two conditions (Rubin, 1985) . That is, predicted item difficulty should be reordered be-Anagrams Alone, New Anagrams Alone, and Anagrams with Solution. Participants were tween the conditions. The two bases for judgments would produce the same ordering of tested individually.
Materials and design. A pool of 200 fiveanagrams in their predicted difficulty only if people had a theory that made predictions letter medium frequency words (from 10 to 49 occurrences per million; as indexed by equivalent to those based on subjective experi- Thorndike & Lorge, 1944) were used as stimProcedure. In the study phase of the experiment all participants were required to read uli. The letters of each of these words could be rearranged to form an anagram with only aloud words presented on the computer screen at a 2-s rate. In the test phase, particione solution. The anagrams were formed using the rule that one letter within the word, pants in the two anagram-alone conditions were told that they would be required to solve picked randomly, was moved (e.g., bench/ enbch).
anagrams and that they would have a maximum of 20 s to solve each one. As soon as From this pool, words were divided into three sets of 60 words each, with an equal they had solved the anagram presented, they were to say the solution word aloud. If they distribution of word frequency. One set was always presented in the test phase for all con-were correct, the experimenter would press a key to go on but if they were incorrect, ditions. For the old Anagrams Alone condition these were the old items and for the other two they were informed and could continue to try to solve it. If they did not solve the anagram conditions (New Anagrams Alone and Anagrams with Solution) they were new items. within the time allotted, they were told the solution word. After they solved the anagram The terms ''alone'' or ''with solution'' refer to whether or not an anagram is presented with or were given the solution word, the experimenter pressed a key and the anagram reapor without its solution word in the test phase. The remaining 20 words from the pool were peared with a rating scale several lines below.
Participants were then required to rate how also always presented during the test phase as new baseline items for all conditions, which difficult they thought the anagram would be for other students to solve. Participants rated resulted in an 80-word test list.
In the study phase, a 120-word list was pre-the anagram difficulty for others by using a game paddle to move a pointer along a scale sented. For the New Anagrams Alone and Anagrams with Solution conditions, this list labeled on the left ''VERY EASY'' and on the right ''VERY HARD.'' and pressing an was made up of the other two sets of 60 words. For the Old Anagrams Alone condition, the enter button to record their responses. The locations on the pointer were then recorded list consisted of one of the sets of filler items presented to the other two conditions along within the data file on a scale from 1 (''very easy'') to 255 (''very hard''). with the set of 60 words to be presented during the test phase as old anagrams. Both of the The participants in the Anagrams with Solution condition were advised that they sets used in the other two conditions were used equally often in the Old Anagrams Alone would be presented with anagrams along with their solution words and that they condition in the study phase. This resulted in two different study lists for the Old Anagrams would be required to rate the difficulty of solving the anagrams for other students. The Alone condition. Two orders of presentation were constructed for both the study and test participants were first presented with a solution word which they were to read aloud. lists which resulted in four different list combinations for the New Anagrams Alone and After the participant had read the word, the experimenter pressed a key and the anagram Anagrams with Solution conditions and eight different lists for the Old Anagrams Alone for the word appeared with the solution word several lines above it and the rating condition because of the set rotation in the study phase. Each combination for all condi-scale at the bottom of the screen. The procedure for entering their ratings was the same tions was used equally often. Within these list presentations, items were presented randomly. as it was for the other two groups. The next trial followed immediately. Participants in An additional six medium frequency fiveletter nouns selected with the same restrictions all conditions were not informed about the overlap of items between the study phase as the previous words were employed as practice items for the test phase. and the test phase. Note. RT to solve and RT to rate are in ms. Difficulty was rated on a 255-point scale, from very easy to very difficult. Baseline items are new anagrams for all conditions, critical items are old in the Old Anagrams Alone condition and new in the other conditions.
A practice phase consisting of six trials was Difficulty ratings. We compared the ratings of critical versus baseline items for participresented prior to the main test list in all conditions.
pants across the three conditions using a mixed-model analysis of variance. The interResults action of condition and item type (critical items versus baseline) was significant, F(2,69) Speed of solution. Reading the solution word in the earlier phase of the experiment Å 18.75, MSE Å 136.6. As predicted, simple effects analyses revealed that critical items spoiled RT as a basis for judgment, in that old items were solved more quickly than new were rated as easier than new baseline items only in the Old Anagrams Alone condition items on the test (see Table 1 ). We compared the speed of solving critical versus baseline (where critical items were old) F(1,69) Å 55.23, MSE Å 136.6, but not in the New Anaitems for participants in the Old Anagrams Alone condition versus the New Anagrams grams Alone, F(1,69) Å 1.18 or Anagrams with Solution condition. Alone condition. The interaction of condition and item type was significant. F (1, 45) Å Correlations between RT to solve and ratings. As an index of the use of subjective 27.32, MSE Å 1589479.8. Simple effects analyses revealed a condition effect on the critical experience as a basis for judgments, the correlations between RT to solve anagrams and items, with participants in the Old Anagrams Alone condition solving anagrams signifi-rating of difficulty for others were calculated for each participant for critical items and cantly faster than participants in the New Anagrams Alone condition, F(1,45) Å 26.82, MSE for baseline items and analyzed in a mixedmodel analysis of variance, with condition Å 3812866.3. There was no condition effect on the new baseline items, F õ 1. Simple (Old Anagrams Alone versus New Anagrams Alone) as the between-subjects factor effects analyses also showed that participants in the Old Anagrams Alone condition solved and item type (Critical versus Baseline) as the within-subjects factor. Participants the old critical items faster than the new baseline items, F(1,45) Å 86.73, MSE Å given the opportunity to solve an anagram before rating its difficulty for others ap-1589479.8, whereas participants in the New Anagrams Alone condition did not solve the peared to use their own subjective experience of item difficulty as a basis for judgnew critical items faster than the new baseline items, F(1,45) Å 3.25, p õ .08. ment. The average correlation between RT to solve anagrams and the rating of difficulty participants in the Anagrams with Solution condition used a different basis for difficulty for others was substantial (mean r Å .75) and did not vary between the Old Anagrams judgments than participants in the two anagram-alone conditions, we collapsed difficulty Alone versus New Anagrams Alone condition or between critical and baseline items, ratings across participants in each condition, and compared the rank-ordering of item diffiall F's õ 1.
Correlations between difficulty ratings and culty across conditions. If participants in the Old Anagrams Alone and New Anagrams criterion difficulty. The performance of participants in the New Anagrams Alone condition Alone conditions used their experience of difficulty as a basis for judgments and particiis the criterion for prediction in all conditions: that is, the reaction time to solve anagrams in pants in the Anagrams with Solution condition used a different basis for judgments, such as the New Anagrams Alone condition is exactly what participants in all three conditions were rules, then the difference in processes should be revealed by more similar orderings of item trying to predict. Item analyses of difficulty ratings were compared to this criterion of actual difficulty ratings between conditions that share a process (the New Anagrams Alone difficulty for the three conditions, by computing the average rating of each item across parti-condition and the Old Anagrams Alone condition) compared to the ordering of item difficipants in a condition. The correlation was very high for the New Anagrams Alone condition, culty ratings between conditions that rely more on different processes (the correlation of r(58) Å .96. However, the correlation between actual difficulty and the item analysis of ratings item difficulty between either of the Anagrams Alone conditions and the Anagrams with Somade by participants in the Old Anagrams Alone condition is also high, r(58) Å .89, albeit lution condition). The correlation of rated item difficulty between the Old Anagrams Alone significantly lower than in the New Anagrams Alone condition, Z Å 2.80. In contrast, partici-and New Anagrams Alone conditions was significantly higher, r (58) Å .90, than the correpants who were prevented from using their own experiences solving the anagrams as a basis for lation between the Anagrams with Solution and New Anagrams Alone conditions, r (58) judgments, that is, participants in the Anagrams with Solution condition, did not predict the Å .69, Z Å 3.34, and significantly higher than the Anagrams with Solution and Old Anarank ordering of item difficulty as well as the other two conditions, r(58) Å .69. The three grams Alone conditions, r(58) Å .62, Z Å 3.99. The correlation of Anagrams with Solucorrelations are not equal, V(3) Å 34.4 (a test of whether the three sample correlations represent tion and New Anagrams Alone does not differ from the correlation of Anagrams with Solupopulations with equal correlations; see Hayes (1981) .
tion and the Old Anagrams Alone (Z Å .66). Judgment latency. Participants in the AnaDiscussion grams with Solution condition appeared to use a different basis for difficulty judgments than Our interpretation of the pattern of results is that participants in the New Anagrams Alone participants in the two anagram-alone conditions, as reflected by significant differences in condition used their subjective experience of anagram difficulty as a basis for judging for the time to rate anagrams, F(2,69) Å 14.32, MSE Å 1441883. Newman-Keul's analysis others, as indexed by the correlations between speed of solving and rated difficulty. In conrevealed that participants in the Anagrams with Solution condition made their ratings trast, when participants' direct experience of the difficulty of solving an anagram was more slowly than participants in either of the two anagram-alone conditions and that the lat-blocked by the presence of the solution word, they were forced to use a different basis for ter two conditions did not differ.
Rank ordering of items according to diffi-judgment. We diagnosed the presence of two bases for judgments in several ways. First, culty ratings. To further investigate whether participants took longer to judge anagram dif-tively, participants in the Anagrams with Solution condition may have applied an effortful ficulty in the Anagrams with Solution condition compared to the New Anagrams Alone (although perhaps implausible) algorithm to simulate how difficult it would be to solve Condition, as we would expect if they were applying rules and analysis to make their judg-particular anagrams. That is, they might imagine moving the first letter to the second posiments rather than simply generalizing from their own experience of difficulty. Second, the tion, then third position, and so forth, followed by moving the second letter through all posirank ordering of the items differed between the Anagrams with Solution condition and the tions, and so forth, until they moved the right letter to create the solution word. Or particiNew Anagrams Alone condition, which suggests some lack of overlap in the processes pants may have tried to imagine solving the anagram according to some heuristic even underlying the judgments (Rubin, 1985) . Finally, participants who based their judgments though they knew the solution word. Future research could investigate these judgment proon subjective experience better predicted the rank ordering of actual item difficulty than did cesses with a protocol analysis (cf. Ericsson & Simon, 1993) . However, our focus is on the participants who were unable to experience solving the anagrams because of the blocking qualitative distinction between judgments based on subjective experience and more anaeffect of the solution word.
We argue that presenting the solution word lytic alternatives. The subjective experience of item difficulty prior to the anagram does indeed block the subjective experience of anagram difficulty. was lowered for participants who read the solutions to items in the first phase and so their People often solve anagrams by pronouncing parts of the anagrams and using the phonemic subjective experience of difficulty was spoiled as a basis for predicting for others. According information as a cue for retrieving the solution (Fink & Weisberg, 1981) . In line with that to the diagnostic indicators of theory-based versus subjective experience-based judgments analysis, the prior reading of the solution words made the solutions more accessible dur-outlined above, participants in the Old Anagrams Alone condition nonetheless continued ing cued retrieval and so decreased the latency to solve the anagrams. Participants may expe-to use subjective experience as a basis for judgment: They rated old anagrams as easier rience arriving at the solution as a sudden, allor-none process (Metcalfe, 1986 ; Weisberg, for others than the new baseline items; they showed a substantial correlation between their 1992), because they cannot predict whether a cue will retrieve a solution. When the solution own solution time and rated difficulty; they made their judgments relatively quickly, as word is presented immediately prior to reading the anagram, the effectiveness of the ana-did participants in the New Anagrams Alone Condition; and their rank ordering of item difgram as a retrieval cue cannot be directly experienced, and so participants must base their ficulty (collapsed across participants) was more similar to the ordering of items produced judgments of difficulty on other information.
We suggest that when deprived of the direct by participants in the New Anagrams Alone condition than that produced by participants experience of attempting to solve the anagram, participants in the Anagrams with Solution in the Anagrams with Solution Condition.
One effect of reading the solutions to anacondition were forced to use a more analytic basis for judgment. We did not obtain direct grams was to increase the solution rate in the Old Anagrams Alone condition, from .65 to evidence that participants used rules about anagram difficulty to judge Anagram with So-.74. Thus, participants in the New Anagrams Alone condition more often experienced faillution items, although participants in pilot tests often spontaneously reported reasoning ures to solve anagrams compared to participants in the Old Anagrams Alone condition, such as ''I would have never have been able to come up with such a weird word.'' Alterna-and to participants in the Anagrams with Solu-tion condition who never experienced failures duration, pleasantness, or difficulty, they may interpret variations in speed of processing as (or successes). However, this difference in failure rate did not create the differences variations in those other dimensions. By this attributional account of illusory effects of past among conditions. Subanalyses that excluded solution failures in the Old Anagrams Alone experience (Jacoby et al., 1989) , the misattributed effect of past experience could disappear and New Anagrams Alone conditions revealed patterns of results that were identical to the if participants become aware of its source in past experience. As an example, Jacoby and overall analyses in terms of lowered difficulty ratings for old items, faster RT to solve old Whitehouse (1989) varied the ease with which words on a recognition memory test were peritems, and equivalently high correlations between speed of solution and ratings for old ceived in an attempt to create memory illusions. Participants studied a list of words and and new anagrams.
Although we describe the subjective experi-then took a recognition test. Immediately prior to the presentation of each word on the recogence of anagram difficulty as ''spoiled'' by reading the solutions to anagrams in the first nition test, the same word (match), a different word (mismatch) or a string of x's and o's phase of the experiment, it continued to be a useful and easy-to-use heuristic for judging was briefly flashed on the screen, so that participants were unaware of their presentation. difficulty. Although mean difficulty ratings were lower for old anagrams than new ana-For both old and new words on the recognition memory test, a matching context word ingrams, judgments based on subjective experience nonetheless captured the relative diffi-creased the probability of judging an item ''old,'' whereas a mismatching word deculty of the items quite well, far better than the theory-based judgments of participants in creased the probability of judging the item ''old.'' The matching word facilitated percepthe Anagrams with Solution condition, and only slightly worse than participants whose tual processing of the following test word and so increased participants' feeling of familiarsubjective experience was not affected by prior reading of the solution words.
ity. In the case of new words, the brief presentation of a matching context word created an EXPERIMENT TWO: DEBIASING USE OF illusion of memory. SPOILED SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE An important control condition in the Jacoby and Whitehouse study illustrates how the Fluent processing in a perceptual, conceptual, or motor task is an ambiguous cue: It illusions of memory depended upon an inference or an attribution about the source of easy may indicate prior experience and contribute to the experience of remembering, or it may perceptual processing. In a second condition, the matching or mismatching context words reflect characteristics of the current situation such as the intensity of a stimulus or the diffi-were presented for much longer, such that participants were fully aware of them. When parculty of a problem. This ambiguity regarding the source of fluent processing can lead to ticipants were aware of the context words, they were actually less likely to call either an misattributions of the effects of the past as shown in the lowered difficulty ratings for old old or new recognition test word ''old'' when the context word matched the test word than anagrams in the present experiment. What, then, determines the interpretation that partici-when no context word or a mismatch context word was presented. When they were unaware pants give to their fluent processing?
One major determinant is people's orienta-of the context word, people mistakenly attributed their enhanced processing of the test tion. If they are focused toward the past as a source of variation in processing, they will word to having studied it, and so judged it old. In contrast, when aware of the context experience fluent perceptual processing as familiarity. However, if they are focused on word, people correctly attributed their enhanced processing of the test word to having other judgments, such as stimulus intensity, just read it as a matching context word. In Method fact, participants in the aware condition tended Participants. The participants were 48 volto overcorrect for the effect of the matching unteers from an introductory psychology word and so were less likely to judge the test course at McMaster University who served in word old than if no context word had been the experiment for course credit. Participants presented. Similarly, Whittlesea et al. (1990) were randomly assigned to one of three befound that illusions of memory created by adtween-subject experiment conditions: Uninjusting the clarity of visual presentation were formed, Recognition, and Informed Plus Receliminated when participants were informed ognition. Participants were tested individuof the clarity manipulation.
ally. The illusory effect of prior reading of the Materials and design. The words and single solution to an anagram on the later subjective solution anagrams used were selected from the experience of difficulty may be eliminated ones used in Experiment 1. Five items that when participants are made aware that items participants in Experiment 1 found particuwere presented in the first phase, parallel to larly difficult were replaced. From this pool, the aware condition of Jacoby and Whitewords were divided into two sets of 40 words house. However, the experience that old anaeach with each set used equally often as old grams are easy anagrams could be similar to or new words on the test. Each set had an a perceptual illusion such as the Muller-Lyer equal distribution of word frequency within illusion, which does not disappear even when the medium-frequency range. the source of the illusion is described. The A 40-word list was presented in the study illusion that the background noise on a tape phase. Two orders of presentation were conis softer when old sentences are presented structed, which when combined with the rotacompared to new sentences (Jacoby et al., tion of items through the old/new experimen-1988) persists even when one is aware that tal conditions resulted in four different list the sentence is old. Jacoby et al. speculated combinations during study. The test phase that participants were unable to separate the consisted of 80 trials of anagrams presented effects of memory from the physical stimulus to be solved, 40 New Anagrams and 40 Old when judging loudness.
Anagrams (items whose solutions were preIn Experiment 2, we explored the nature of sented in Phase 1). Two test orders were conthe effect of prior reading of solution words structed. The presentation orders of items for on later ratings of anagram difficulty by maboth study and test lists were random with nipulating whether participants were aware the restriction that not more than three items that they had read the solution word in the representing the same condition could be prefirst phase. Participants in the Uninformed sented in a row. condition solved old and new anagrams and An additional six medium-frequency fiverated the difficulty for others, whereas particiletter nouns selected with the same restrictions pants in the Recognition condition were reas the pool of 80 words were used as practice quired to attempt to recognize whether each items in the test phase. solution had been presented in the first phase Procedure. As in Experiment 1, all particiof the experiment prior to rating the anagram's pants in the study phase were required to read difficulty. Participants in a third condition (Inaloud words presented on the computer screen formed plus Recognition) solved old and new at a 2-s rate. Ratings of anagram difficulty at anagrams, attempted to recognize whether the test were made using the game paddle as in solution word had been presented in a first Experiment 1. At test, participants in the Uninphase, and were told that prior presentation formed Condition first saw an anagram to be would make those anagrams easier to solve.
solved and were given a maximum of 20 s to Furthermore, they were cautioned to attempt to avoid those effects in their difficulty ratings. solve it. If they could not solve it in that time, the experimenter told them the solution. The model analysis of variance, with condition as the between-subjects factor, and old versus rating line then appeared on the screen and participants entered their rating with the game new anagrams as the within-subjects factor.
Participants recognized .78 of the old items paddle, from ''very easy'' to ''very hard.'' Participants in the Recognition Condition and produced false alarms to .31 of the new items, F(1,30) Å 4.79, MSE Å .009. The conwere told that they had read the solution word to some of the anagrams and were asked to dition effect was not significant, F(1,30) Å 1.66, MSE Å .026, although there was a sigmake recognition judgments about the anagram solutions prior to rating the difficulty of nificant interaction between item type and condition: Participants in the Recognition coneach anagram. They first attempted to solve the anagram. The anagram was cleared from dition made more false alarms (.36) than did participants in the Informed Plus Recognition the screen and the question ''Old or New?'' appeared. Participants were told to respond condition (.26), F(1,30) Å 4.79.
Difficulty ratings. Given that studying the with their recognition decision which the experimenter keyed in. The rating line then ap-answers to anagrams made those anagrams easier to solve, were participants in the condipeared and participants entered their rating of the difficulty of the anagram. Participants in tions who recognized items as old able to correctly attribute the ease of solution of old anathe Informed Plus Recognition condition were also required to make recognition judgments grams to prior experience, and so escape the problem of spoiled subjective experience of prior to rating each anagram. Furthermore, they were informed about the effect of reading anagram difficulty? A mixed-model analysis of variance of the difficulty ratings revealed the answers on later solving of the anagrams and were cautioned to attempt to avoid the a significant interaction between condition and item type, F(2,45) Å 8.16, MSE Å 86.00. Simeffect of prior reading of the anagram solutions in their ratings of anagram difficulty.
ple effects analyses revealed that for participants in the Uninformed Condition, anagrams A practice phase consisting of six trials of new items was presented prior to the main test for which the solution words had been studied were estimated as less difficult for others than list in all conditions.
were new anagrams, F(1,45) Å 46.98, MSE Å Results 86.00. Similarly, even participants who were required to recognize items as presented on Speed of solution. The mean reaction time for solving anagrams was analyzed in a the earlier list showed the same pattern of estimating old anagrams as less difficult, F(1,45) mixed-model analysis of variance, with condition (Uninformed, Recognition, and Informed Å 36.00. However, the effect of prior study of solutions did not lead to a significant deplus Recognition) as the between-subjects factor and item type (old anagrams versus new crease in item difficulty ratings made by participants who attempted to recognize each item anagrams) as the within-subjects factor. As in the previous experiment, prior reading of before making their difficulty ratings and who were informed of the effect, F(1,45) Å 2.36, solution words speeded the solution of anagrams relative to new baseline anagrams, p õ .13.
Correlation between RT to solve and rat-F(1,45) Å 157.43, MSE Å 1135588 (see Table  2 ). The effect of condition was not significant, ings. How did participants in the Informed Plus Recognition condition overcome the ef-F(1,45) Å 2.335, MSE Å 4637862, p õ .11, nor was the interaction between condition and fects of prior experience reading anagram solutions on later judgments of anagram diffiitem type, F(2,45) Å 1.95.
Recognition. The proportion of items culty? Certainly one option was to shift to another basis for judgments, such as rules, as judged ''old'' by participants in the Recognition Condition and the Informed Plus Recog-was argued above. If so, one would expect a lower average correlation between time to nition Condition was analyzed in a mixed- Note. RT to solve and RT to rate are in ms. Difficulty was rated on a 255-point scale, from very easy to very difficult.
solve anagrams and rating of anagram diffi-were rated slightly more quickly than new items, although this effect was qualified by an culty for participants in the Informed Plus Recognition Condition compared to partici-interaction of item type and condition, F(2,45) Å 14.66. Judgment latency differed for old pants in the other two conditions. The individual correlations between time to solve ana-and new items only in the Uninformed Condition. grams and difficulty ratings were analyzed in a mixed-model analysis of variance. There
Rank ordering of items according to difficulty ratings. A second indication that particiwas a significant condition effect, F(2,45) Å 3.77, MSE Å .069, and a Newman-Keuls pants shifted away from reliance on subjective experience as a basis for anagram difficulty analysis revealed that the average correlation was lower for participants in the Informed in the Informed Plus Recognition Condition is a comparison of the ranked order of difficulty Plus Recognition Condition (mean r Å .59) than the Uninformed Condition (mean r Å ratings for old anagrams, collapsed across participants in each of the three conditions. This .77). The mean correlation for the Recognition Condition fell midway between the other two analysis was performed on the 75 items that overlapped between experiments 1 and 2. The conditions and did not differ significantly from either one of them, mean r Å .66. This correlation between the ordering given by the participants in the Uninformed Condition with supports the notion that participants in the Informed Plus Recognition Condition were less the ordering in the Recognition Condition was r(73) Å .79, which was marginally higher than likely to rely on subjective experience of anagram difficulty as a basis for judging difficulty the correlation between the Uninformed Condition and the Recognition Plus Informed for others. The average correlation was lower on old (mean r Å .65) than on new anagrams Condition, r (73) Judgment latency. There was no effect of Correlation between difficulty ratings and criterion difficulty. As an estimation of the condition on judgment latency (F õ 1). There was, however, a significant difference be-validity of the ordering of the ratings, we collapsed the ratings of the old anagrams across tween old and new anagrams, F(1,45) Å 13.19, MSE Å 66782, such that old anagrams participants within conditions and computed a correlation between average rating and the better captures the ordering of item difficulty, as noted in Experiment 1. criterion average RT to solve the items obtained from participants solving new anaIn Experiment 1, depriving participants of the subjective experience of difficulty by pregrams in Experiment 1. The correlation was r (73) judgment latencies in Experiment 2 were uniformly fast. The Recognition instructions, and even the Informed Plus Recognition instrucDiscussion tions, did not necessarily lead to a change in Orienting participants toward the past by the subjective experience of the difficulty of requiring recognition judgments prior to rating old anagrams. Participants in all three condianagram difficulty did not eliminate the effect tions in Experiment 2 solved the anagrams, of reading solution words on later ratings of and in so doing, may have had such a compeldifficulty. Only by additionally informing par-ling subjective experience of difficulty that ticipants of the nature of the effect of prior they used it as a basis for judging for others study of the solution words and warning them even when they were forced to recognize to avoid that effect in their difficulty ratings items and informed about the nature of the did the difference between ratings of old and effect. Participants in that condition may have new anagrams diminish. There was more simi-anchored their judgments based on subjective larity in the rank ordering of difficulty ratings experience and then attempted to adjust for the made by the Uninformed and Recognition effect of prior study of the anagrams simply as Conditions than those made by the Informed a result of the demand characteristics induced Plus Recognition Condition, which suggests by the instructions exhorting participants to more of an overlap in the bases for judged avoid those effects. We will address these isdifficulty for the former two conditions. sues in more detail later. One interpretation of the continued reliance GENERAL DISCUSSION on subjective experience, even when recognition is required, is that the attributions for fluWe argue that the studies presented here ency are not mutually exclusive; that is, an illustrate the use of subjective experience veranagram can be both old and easy. People may sus theory as a basis for judgments and also be unable to disentangle the effects of past illustrate how specific past experiences can experience on anagram difficulty from charac-alter subjective experience. The high correlateristics of the anagrams. Similarly, perceptual tions between participants' own time to solve illusions such as the moon illusion are effec-anagrams and ratings of the difficulty of those tive even when one is aware of its source. anagrams for others are in line with our conAlternatively, participants who recognized the tention that the ratings are based on subjective anagrams as old may not have comprehended experience. In contrast, when participants the nature of the influence of prior reading of were prevented from experiencing the diffithe anagram and so did not attempt to correct culty of solving the anagrams by reading the for that influence or shift to a different basis solution word before the anagram, they were for judgment (Bowers, 1984) . A third alterna-forced to switch to an alternative basis for tive is that participants who recognized the judgment. We assume (and conversations with item as old nonetheless based their difficulty participants concur) that the alternative basis judgments on subjective experience because for judgment consisted of analysis of the it is a much easier basis for judgment than structure of the anagram and rules such as ''unusual words would be hard to solve.'' shifting to a theory of anagram difficulty, and These experiments identified several differ-nature of the old/new effect and requiring recognition judgments did we diminish the old/ ences in performance that can serve as diagnostic tools for determining whether partici-new effect on difficulty ratings.
We suggest that the distinction between pants are using subjective experience or theory as a basis for judgment. Judgments based judgments based on subjective experience and judgments based on theory is important in a on subjective experience were made more quickly than judgments based on theory and number of domains. We will first discuss the nature of the differences between these two led to a different ordering of the rated difficulty of the items than did judgments based bases for judgments. Next, we discuss the conditions under which subjective experience can on theory. Also, in this domain at least (and within this range of items) participants did not be spoiled as a basis for judgment, and finally, we explore the generality of subjective experiappear to have a particularly good theory about anagram difficulty: the average ratings ence as a basis for judgments. made by participants relying on subjective exSubjective Experience versus Theory perience better predicted the true ordering of item difficulty than did the average ratings Subjective experience as a basis for judgment is nonanalytic and uncontrolled. People made by participants relying on rules.
Subjective experience as a basis for judg-are likely to be unaware of the factors that contribute to a particular subjective experiment can be spoiled by irrelevant factors, in particular by specific prior experience. Al-ence, and so are vulnerable to factors such as specific past experiences. Nisbett and Wilson though reading the answers to a set of anagrams decreased the solution time, partici-(1977), Greenwald and Banaji (1995) , and Wilson and Brekke (1994) review a variety of pants misattributed their easy solution of old anagrams to qualities inherent in the ana-cases in which people's judgments are influenced by factors of which they are unaware, grams. Participants continued to use their subjective experience as a basis for judgment, such as halo effects or the sex or race of a target person. As Wilson and Brekke note, as shown by the continued high correlation between solution time and rated difficulty and people's experience is the final product-a subjective experience of ''this is a good paby the more rapid ratings relative to the condition where anagrams were read with their so-per'' rather than the separate influences of factors such as sex, race, or attractiveness. lutions (which prevented the use of subjective experience). Consequently, the anagrams for Wilson and Brekke focus on the negative consequences of unconscious influences on which the solution word had been read earlier were rated as easier for others than were new judgment, which they refer to as ''mental contamination.'' Yet the use of subjective experianagrams. However, even these judgments based on spoiled subjective experience corre-ence as a basis for judgment may be a generally valid heuristic. Just as the availability lated better with the criterion (the ranking of average solution times on new anagrams) than heuristic is normally a useful way of judging frequency, one's own experience of the diffidid judgments based on rules.
In Experiment 2, we explored whether the culty of a problem may be a good indicator of how others will do on the problem. Arkes misattribution of the effect of prior experience on anagram judgments would be eliminated (1991) holds that a variety of judgmental biases in the laboratory are actually the result when participants were required to recognize the items as old. Recognition judgments did of very adaptive systems. He classifies the availability heuristic, explanation bias, hindnot affect the size of the old/new difference in difficulty ratings, although it somewhat at-sight bias, and representativeness heuristic as consequences of an adaptive associationistic tenuated the size of the correlation between participant's own solution times and rated dif-memory system that will occasionally produce errors. ficulty. Only by informing participants of the Hoch (1987) analyzed the accuracy of peo-sions for Consumer Reports. When participants were asked simply to taste the jams and ple's predictions of the attitudes of several target groups (e.g., the general public's atti-rank them their rankings correlated fairly well with the experts' rankings. However, when tude regarding whether ''[t]he government should exercise more control over what is participants in another condition were asked to provide reasons for their judgments, their shown on television,'') and found that people projected their own attitudes on the targets. rankings of the quality of the jams was less like that of the experts. Wilson and Schooler As we discuss below, this projection may be another case of subjective experience being argued that forcing their participants to think about why they liked or disliked each jam interpreted as objective reality. However, a majority of participants in Hoch's experiment turned an affective response into a more cognitive one, and in this case the cognitive judgcould have increased their predictive accuracy by projecting even more. Hoch noted that pre-ments did not capture the experts' ranking of quality. People's analysis of what makes a jam dictive accuracy depends on two factors: First, the similarity between the participant and tar-good may be based on a bad theory. Perhaps unanalyzed affect captures more important diget, and second, the predictive validity of the information that the participant can use in ad-mensions or weights the dimensions more appropriately than a cognitive analysis. Our dition or instead of his or her own positions. For Hoch's items, people seemed to have little analysis of subjective experience versus theory as a basis for judgment suggests that in alternative information-a substantial portion of the participants would have been more ac-addition to affect, other qualities of subjective experience are used in judgment, in particular curate in their predictions for others if they had simply reported their own positions. Anal-ease of processing, and that they can be excellent bases for social predictions. ogously, in our paradigm when people base their judgments for others on their own subjec-
The Attribution of Fluency and tive experience, they need not be aware of Debiasing Attempts the influence of a factor in order to exhibit a sensitivity to that factor in their judgments for Illusions of memory are sometimes eliminated when participants are made aware of the others, nor do they have to be aware of any metric for combining important cues. In that source of the effects (Whittlesea et al., 1990; Jacoby et al., 1988 , but see Lindsay & Kelley, sense, the heuristic value of judgments based on subjective experience can be high and this issue). Similarly, Bornstein and D'Agostino (1990) found that the mere exposure efshould be matched only by a very sophisticated theory.
fect on pleasantness or liking judgments is smaller under conditions when participants re-A distinction similar to our contrast between theory and subjective experience as a alize that past experience is actually the source of perceptual fluency occurring during the basis for judgments is the reason versus affect contrast of Wilson and Schooler (1991) . They pleasantness judgments. However, pointing out to participants that some anagram solustudied the effects of requiring participants to list reasons for their judgments when pre-tions had been studied did not eliminate the solutions' influence on judged difficulty. This dicting preferences for themselves and for others and found that translating affective reac-effect, then, parallels the perceptual judgments that are affected by prior experience even tions into reasons can be disruptive. For example, one experiment had participants taste and when participants are aware of the old/new status of items at test. rate the quality of five different brands of strawberry jam. The Wilson and Schooler criFluency is not necessarily in a ''trading relationship'' (Whittlesea, 1993) among various terion measure of ''goodness of ratings'' was the rank-ordering of the jams by a panel of attributions and misattributions. Whittlesea (1993, Experiment 6) found that fluency can experts who had rated the jams on 16 dimen-simultaneously be misinterpreted as pleasant-though available, were apparently regarded as an unsatisfactory basis for judgment. Particiness and as familiarity. He manipulated conceptual fluency by varying whether test words pants in an earlier within-participants version of Experiment 1 (reported in Jacoby & Kelley, were preceded by a predictive context (The stormy seas tossed the BOAT) or a neutral 1987) clearly preferred to experience solving the anagrams, and in fact several participants context (He saved up his money and bought a BOAT). Participants first studied a short list attempted to cover up the solution words with their hands on the Anagrams with Solution of briefly presented words, then made pleasantness ratings for each word, followed by items.
The fact that the subjective experience of recognition memory judgments. Predictive contexts led to higher pleasantness ratings and anagram difficulty continued to dominate judgments in the Recognition Condition of an increased probability of calling an item old relative to those items presented in neutral Experiment 2 may indicate that it is simply a compelling and salient basis for judgments. contexts. The pleasantness judgments and repetition judgments were actually positively cor-Just as people are prone to discount intellectual explanations of perceptual illusions and related rather than in a trading relationship. Similarly, in the Recognition memory condi-continue to experience the illusion, they may find it hard to discount their subjective experition of our Experiment 2, recognition of an item did not usurp the misattribution of flu-ence of a problem being difficult. Similarly, teachers may find it hard to reject the belief ency as due to an item's being easy.
One important dimension of whether aware-that their lectures are models of clarity but their students are dull-witted. Subjective expeness of the study episodes is important for alterations of subjective experience may be rience that is informed by prior experience or privileged knowledge could nonetheless be the availability of an alternative basis for responding. The illusion of memory experi-felt as an accurate depiction of external reality.
Arkes (1991) reviewed evidence that debiments altered participants' subjective experience of familiarity. Rajaram (1993) found that asing manipulations such as increased incentives work when people's errors stem from presenting masked prime words in the procedure used by Jacoby and Whitehouse in-their use of suboptimal strategies, strategies that take little effort but are somewhat effeccreased recognition judgments of ''knowing'' that an item had been studied, but did not tive (cf. Chaiken's distinction between heuristic and systematic information processing). In influence judgments of ''remembering'' details of the study experience. Participants in contrast, he argued that ''association-based'' errors are not affected by incentives or exhorJacoby and Whitehouse's aware condition could have shifted to the more analytic ''re-tations because those effects occur automatically and it would be difficult for participants membering'' basis for recognition judgments to avoid the illusions of familiarity. In con-to stop being affected by associations. We think the spoiling of subjective experience by trast, in the case of perceptual judgments such as loudness there are no alternatives to subjec-specific prior episodes is an automatic effect that typically occurs without awareness. Howtive experience as a basis for judgment. An analogous illusion is that we often experience ever, people can shift to more demanding theory-based judgments and that strategy will be speech in an unknown foreign language as extremely rapid compared to speech in a effective to the extent that their theory is a good one. known language, yet the impression persists even though we know that the ''pauses'' we Relation to Other Phenomenon hear in our native language are illusory. There may be no alternative basis for judging the Subjective experience in communication. Effective communication requires us to take speed. In line with this argument, when judging anagram difficulty, theories and rules, al-the perspective of the other and because we tend to rely on our own subjective experience selective exposure to people who are like oneof a situation to predict for others, we make self. Perhaps the false consensus effect derives errors. Fussell and Kraus (1992) found that from a process similar to our experiments on participants gave higher estimates for the per-judging problem difficulty-subjective expecentage of people who would know the name rience appears to be an objective representaof a public figure given a picture when they tion of the situation. In line with this interpreknew the name themselves relative to when tation, Gilovich, Jennings, and Jennings they did not know the name. In a referential (1983) found that the false consensus effect communication task about the public figures, is smaller when people are directed to make participants used those estimates to model personal attributions rather than situational attheir partner's understanding: The amount of tributions for their choices. Furthermore, information participants used to refer to pic-items that elicit personal attributions (would tures of the public figures varied inversely you rather watch gymnastics or track and with the perceived identifiability of the target. field?) show smaller false consensus effects Clearly, such knowledge could be privileged than items that elicit situational attributions or biased by recent experiences, just as when (e.g., would you rather heat with wood or reading an answer to a question increases the oil?). When asked to rate the difficulty of likelihood of later being able to answer the problems, estimate the difficulty of a test, or question (Kelley & Lindsay, 1993) .
assess the comprehensibility of a manuscript, Keysar (1994) demonstrated how the failure people may be particularly prone to regard to account for privileged knowledge can lead their subjective experience as an index of obto poor predictions regarding people's detec-jective characteristics of the task rather than tion of sarcasm and irony. Participants read focus on the effects of their own abilities and about a person who received a recommenda-prior experience. tion from another person regarding a restauGilovich (1990) also found that the false rant for a special dinner. He followed the rec-consensus effect in social judgment occurs to ommendation but the dinner was a disaster. a greater extent when there is more latitude The next day, the recommender asked ''How for construing the options in different ways. did you like the restaurant?'' and he replied Participants in false consensus experiments ''It was great.'' Participants were asked to are asked questions such as ''Which color do predict whether a person listening to that final you like better, aqua or tan?'' and then try to exchange would detect the sarcasm in ''It was estimate the proportion of college students great.'' They predicted that the sarcasm would who would make the same choices. The parbe readily apparent, even though it was only ticipant has to make a particular interpretation apparent to the participants themselves beof what is meant by ''aqua'' and ''tan'' and cause of their privileged knowledge that the then choose between the two. However, partirestaurant was bad.
cipants who interpret such questions may not The false consensus bias. Our demonstrarealize the degree to which their particular tion of the use of subjective experience as a construal of the elements of the choice is idiobasis for judgments for others is similar to the syncratic; that is, they might imagine a particfalse consensus effect (Ross, Green, & House, ularly ugly aqua and a pleasing tan, choose 1977; Goethals, Allison, & Frost, 1979) . Peotan, and assume that most right thinking people who hold a particular opinion or attitude ple would make a similar choice. When the or chose one behavioral option over another choices are not open to different construals, think that their position or choice is relatively as when specific paint chips are used, the false more common than people who make an alterconsensus effect disappears. Griffin and Ross nate choice. The false consensus effect has (1991) suggest that much human misunderbeen interpreted as reflecting a motivation to appear normal or rational, or as a result of standing may stem from people's failure to appreciate the degree to which their construal REFERENCES of a situation differs from that of others. ARKES, H. R. (1991 that influence what we aim to predict.
